INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS IN GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY

SOURCES AND EFFECTS OF BUREAUCRATIC INFLUENCE

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MONEY AND TIME

Budgeting and Resourcing in International Public Administrations

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Introduction

Budgeting and resourcing are fundamental to every larger public organisation. Budgeting is concerned with identifying and determining the financial resources available to the organisation; and with deciding on levels of expenditure and on the allocation of funds to particular tasks and specific expenditure categories, such as personnel, physical infrastructure, or running costs. Resourcing is about ensuring that the organisation disposes of the funds necessary to carry out its tasks and is able to employ these resources for the budgeted purposes and at the time when they are needed.

Resourcing poses a special challenge to public organisations that cannot rely on funds that are generated on a compulsory basis. The latter include, in particular, taxes, tariffs, fees, or, in the case of International Organisations (IOs), mandatory contributions of members assessed on the basis of elaborate funding formulas. Rather than being able to count on mandatory contributions, many IOs rely principally, or sometimes even exclusively, on voluntary funding. And even in the case of many IOs that have access to mandatory funds, the share of voluntary contributions, often referred to as 'donations', is increasing. This observation applies especially to IOs mandated with direct service delivery rather than regulatory tasks or the provision of expertise. A prime example is IOs active in global refugee policy and humanitarian aid, such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA); the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), both of which are dependent on voluntary contributions; and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), for which project funding is essential.

budgeting and resourcing as fundamental to the operation of IOs and IPAs (Goetz and Patz, 2017; Goetz and Patz, 2016), and disciplinary developments in comparative public administration and comparative public policy have spurred an interest in temporality (Howlett and Goetz, 2014).

Turning, first, to 'real-world' trends that have propelled budgeting, and, in particular, resourcing centre-stage in debates on IOs and IPAs, four developments deserve highlighting. First, the past decade has been marked by repeated funding crises that have affected several high-profile IOs and have drawn attention to the fragility of the financial bases on which they operate. One prominent example has been the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) which, in 2011, was hit by a budget freeze from the US (and Israel) that amounted to 28 per cent of its whole assessed budget (Patz and Goetz, 2019: 164–178), raising the spectre of an actual bankruptcy of the organisation. Another example has been UNRWA which suffered a very dramatic cut in funding when the US government announced a sudden and immediate stop of US voluntary funding in 2018, depriving the organisation of its largest donor. In both cases, budgetary crises required immediate changes in resourcing strategies (Eckhard, Patz, and Schmidt, 2019).

Second, there has been remarkable growth in the budgets of some IOs, notably those dealing with environmental policy, humanitarian aid, refugee policy, or disaster management and relief. To give just one example, both nominal and real expenditures of UNHCR increased by more than 50 per cent between 2007 and 2017, reflecting a steep increase in UNHCR's 'populations of concern', notably internally displaced persons. Against this background, interest in the question of what role IPAs play in securing additional resources has intensified.

Third, growing attention has been paid to the importance of voluntary contributions (donations) in the financing of IOs (see, e.g., Graham, 2017; Reinsberg, 2017). Unlike 'assessed contributions', that is, mandatory 'membership fees' for contracting states, voluntary contributions cannot be taken for granted, but are under continuous negotiation. Particular attention has been paid to 'earmarked contributions', that is, contributions provided for specific purposes, and to the question of whether they might undermine the delivery of the core mandates of IOs. In the case of UNHCR, for example, 87 per cent of its budget in 2017 consisted of voluntary contributions, the bulk of which came from ten donors. An even more extreme case is the IOM which relies almost entirely on contracted project funding. This is reflected in a decentralised, project-driven resourcing policy (Patz and Thorvaldsdottir, 2020).

Fourth, academic interest in resourcing has been spurred by the increasingly high profile of non-state, non-public actors in the financing of IOs (see, e.g., Adams and Seitz, 2015; Seitz and Martens, 2017). The considerable contribution of private actors to the financing of IOs has attracted special interest in the field of public health, where, prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Gates Foundation had become the second largest donor to the WHO (Patz and Goetz, 2019: 180–194). Critics have pointed to the potential of conflicts of interests between private

donors—even when they take the form of private charitable foundations—and public mandate delivery.

In sum, budgeting and resourcing go to the heart of the policy-making capacity of IOs; and their empirical analysis allows deep and detailed insights into the operation of IPAs and the relationship between IPAs, member states, and other stakeholders.

Academic interest in budgeting and resourcing has also benefitted from disciplinary developments in comparative public administration and public policy that have direct growing attention to temporality as a key focus of empirical observation (Howlett and Goetz, 2014; Howlett, 2022). There are many different dimensions to temporality, ranging from an interest in policy cycles, crisis, and emergency policy-making to the sustainability of public policies or, in causal analysis, the importance of process sequences. With a focus on public administration, the European Commission, in particular, has been the subject of time-centred analyses, including, for example, studies that seek to explain the timing of Commission policy proposals or the time horizons of Commission policy initiatives (Goetz, 2014).

In the present context, six empirical dimensions of temporality have been especially relevant. They include (1) time embedded in institutions, understood as time rules governing decision-making that relate to timing, sequencing, speed, duration, and the frequency of actions; (2) time embedded in organisations, encompassing time-related organisational features, such as typical organisational rhythms; (3) time embedded in actor constellations, notably as concerns the relationships between permanent administrative staff, contracted, fixed-term staff, and changeable political actors; (4) time embedded in budgeting and resourcing procedures, relating, for example, to the ability of IOs to mobilise resources quickly in the case of sudden unforeseen need; (5) time embedded in policy problems, such as the question of whether problems are singular or recurrent, time-limited or open-ended, or whether the appear suddenly or evolve gradually; and (6) time embedded in policy instruments, relating, for example, to the question of whether policy instruments are oriented towards immediate results—such as emergency aid—or designed to produce long-term effects.

Starting Observations, Questions, and Empirical Foci

The findings reported in this chapter are based on two studies: a comparative assessment on budgeting in IOs with a focus on the role of IPAs and, in a second step, a comparative analysis of the resourcing of global refugee policy. In the latter analysis, the focus is on three IOs—UNHCR, UNRWA, and IOM—and on how their IPAs seek to secure financial resources for their tasks. This section sets out briefly the starting observations of both studies, the key questions, and the empirical foci, before the next section presents central findings.

The analysis of IO budgeting captures budgetary procedures in the UN and its IPA, the UN Secretariat, 12 specialised UN organisations, and other funds and programmes. Among the UN organisations, four—the UN core, the International

Labour Organization (ILO), UNESCO, and WHO—are selected for in-depth exploration. The starting observation has been that budgeting in IOs is, on paper, densely regulated and highly regularised. As in the case of budgeting in national public authorities, formal budgeting rules provide detailed guidance on issues of timing, for example, when budget proposals have to be submitted and by what time they have to be adopted; sequence, for example, determining the order in which drafts have to be assessed; speed, for example, how quickly comments on drafts have to be provided; and duration, for example, relating to the maximum amount of time available for consultations. However, regularisation and routinisation can be expected to meet with strong obstacles. They do not just lie in the ever-present possibility of sudden events that affect revenue or expenditure needs, but, more systematically, in *prima facie* evidence of complex principal-agent (P–A) relationships between political decision-makers, notably member states, and IPAs and, in some cases, high degrees of political contestation, as in the case of UNESCO (Eckhard, Patz, and Schmidt, 2019). Under these circumstances, adopting a regular budget on time and in accordance with the prescribed procedures constitutes a major challenge.

Against this background, the central questions refer to how IOs in the UN system manage to put together their budgets; how complex P–A relationships shape the budgetary processes; and what organisational and behavioural consequences flow from the complexity of both principals and agents. Drawing on rational organisational institutionalism, the complexity of actor constellations, combined with political contestation, can be expected to encourage the search for organisational fixes, so as to limit disruption and allow the maintenance of organisational routines aimed at the adoption of regular budgets on time. The comparative design captures the UN core and 12 specialised UN agencies over a ten-year period (2006–2015); it also extends to a range of UN funds and programmes. The empirical data cover the systematic analysis of budgetary rules, procedures, and practices, with a special emphasis on observations regarding the temporality of the budgetary process. What have been the rules guiding budgeting? Have the rules been observed? And what IPA practices have supported the operation of the formal rules?

The second analysis refers to the question how the resourcing strategies of IOs have responded to funding requirements in global refugee policy. The temporal focus here is on the characteristics of the policy problems faced by IOs and how IPAs, in particular, have responded to these. Briefly, global refugee policy is characterised by the co-existence of both sudden surges in problem pressure, to which IPAs need to respond quickly and decisively, and long-term, open-ended engagements, most notably in the case of refugee populations and internationally displaced persons that have no realistic prospect of returning to their original places of residence within the foreseeable future. A prime example of the latter is the work of UNRWA, which has, for decades, provided a broad range of services, including schooling and health services, to Palestinian refugees and their descendants in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank. The key empirical focus

is how IPAs handle both short-term crisis and open-ended commitments. More specifically, how successful are they at channelling resources in the short term to where they are most needed? And how do they maintain long-term support for what may appear as irresolvable refugee situations?

The empirical research on these questions is divided into two parts. In the first part, we ask how the affective styles in the administrative reporting of IOs vary in response to variable problem pressures and changing actor constellations so as to ensure the long-term commitment of donors. Drawing on theories of administrative accountability, we expect that agencies decide on the affective style of their reporting to achieve congruence with accountability forums, notably to gain their continued commitment. We have tested this hypothesis on the basis of a dictionary-based sentiment analysis of the annual reports of UNRWA covering the years from 1951 to 2019, UNHCR from 1953 to 2019, and IOM from 2000 to 2019.

The second part captures whether UNHCR has been able to fulfil its mandate in response to rapidly evolving refugee crises by allocating expenditures to where need has been greatest. This question is of special relevance given that UNHCR relies almost entirely on voluntary contributions and, in light of arguments in the academic literature, the geostrategic interests of donors threaten to undermine the capacity of donor-financed IOs to deliver their core mandates. In line with the latter expectation, we explore the proposition that stronger donor interest in recipient countries is associated with higher levels of UNHCR expenditures in those countries. Put differently: do donor interests in particular countries or regions drive the allocation of UNHCR resources that are made available by donors for specific purposes? To answer this question, we assembled a novel dataset of UNHCR finances and expenditure allocation covering the years 1967 to 2016 and developed 'influence-weighted interest scores' to measure collective donor influence. We complement this analysis by an exploration of IOM revenue and expenditure patterns.

How Do IPAs Manage?

Understanding IO budgeting and the role of IPAs in budgeting requires attention to several basic conditions that shape organisational practice. First, decisions about the budget are intensely political since they determine 'who gets what, when, how'. No part of the organisation is unaffected by the budget; intra-organisational competition for resources is often intense; demands typically exceed the resources that are likely to be available; and the interests and preferences of the IO, the interests and preferences of funders, and the interests and preferences of stakeholders are unlikely to be closely aligned (and may sometimes clash). Budgeting is thus a political exercise.

Since under these conditions, agreement may be very difficult to secure, the preparation and adoption of budgets follow elaborate rules designed to improve the chances of agreement. The existing budget is typically used as the baseline for the preparation of the following budget, so that discussions tend to focus on

changes rather than the overall shape of the budget. The preparation of the next budget usually starts right after the adoption of the current budget (or even earlier), so that enough time is given for consultation and negotiation. The timelines to be followed are detailed, so that actors' uncertainty is reduced. Yet, there are also strict deadlines to be adhered to, so that decisions cannot be postponed without risking that the organisation eventually has to operate without a budget in place.

The analysis of budgeting practices across a large number of UN organisations, complemented by in-depth analyses of budgeting for the UN core, ILO, UNESCO, and WHO, has revealed three major responses to the difficulties that IO budgeting entails: proceduralisation, segmentation, and challenged routinisation (for a comprehensive analysis see Patz and Goetz, 2019; see also Patz and Goetz, 2017). Proceduralisation stands for the

> multiplication of opportunities for the formal or informal intervention by the principal(s) or the agent(s) during the different stages of budgeting. Increased proceduralisation implies the need for additional consultations, negotiations, and bargaining in iterative feedback loops of budgeting decision-making among and between complex principal(s) and agent(s)' (Patz and Goetz, 2019: 44). Budgetary segmentation 'is present when an international organisation's overall budget is split into different parts that each have partially or fully separate budgeting procedures and/or are financed from different earmarked sources.
>
> *Patz and Goetz, 2019: 53*

And challenged routinisation 'is defined as the occurrence of delays beyond legally defined or customary budgeting deadlines, for example when budgeting is delayed until after the beginning of a new budget period' (Patz and Goetz, 2019: 50).

Evidence of proceduralisation in budgeting comes in many forms and tends to exceed formal requirements. It reflects both the complexity of principals and of administrative agents. For example, in the cases of the UN core, ILO, UNESCO, and WHO,

> there are various forms of budget outlines, preliminary budget proposals, or at least early programmatic outlines, that are discussed by the executive or plenary bodies of these organizations (...) even before the official budget drafting commences in line with core organisational rules. Principals are therefore much more involved in the early drafting stages than formally acknowledged.
>
> *Patz and Goetz, 2019: 199*

Our findings also reveal a very dense web of additional consultation processes both within and between IPAs, member states, and donors. They involve, for example, IPAs'

informal consultations with individual national delegations, in particular national contributors, in IOs' headquarters in Geneva, New York, and Paris but also in national capitals, sometimes up to the level of the IOs' Directors-General on one side and national ministers on the other.

Patz and Goetz, 2019: 199

Segmented budgets and segmented budgeting likewise owe much to the diversity of interests and preferences among states, donors, and different parts of IPAs. Segmentation limits the need for agency-wide agreement; and it implies that different sets of actors negotiate over different parts of an IO's budget. For example, in the UN, the segmentation between the core budget, the peacekeeping budget, and Special Political Missions reduces the need for cross-sectoral compromises. Thus, our research has found that

agreements on peacekeeping budgets involved much less micromanagement from states because, once agreements on peacekeeping missions among the Security Council members had been achieved, translating these priorities was easier than in regular UN budgeting where no similar strong agreements among the major contributors and global powers existed.

Patz and Goetz, 2019: 201

The limits to maintaining routines—that is, challenged routinisation—become apparent when budget crises strike. Thus, we have found that overall budgeting in the IOs, funds, and programmes that we have examined appears 'to be fairly routinized and predictable' (Patz and Goetz, 2019: 199), but 'timelines were hard to meet in years with specific budget pressures' (Patz and Goetz, 2019: 199–200). In such instances, there is evidence of strong involvement of the IO leadership in the budgeting process. For example, in the wake of the financial crisis of the mid-2010s, the Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon, 'intervened during the preparation of the budgets (...) in order to stifle internal demands from departments for budget increases at a time when member states where not ready to support regular budget increases for most areas' (Patz and Goetz, 2019: 200).

As our research has underlined, the diversification of voluntary budgetary sources, combined with the rise of earmarking, has meant that budgeting and resourcing policy have become ever more closely intertwined. This is most clearly evident in the case of IOM. As our analysis shows (Patz and Thorvaldsdottir, 2020), the

programme and budget adopted by the organization every year only contains conservative calculations for projects whose funding is already secured from donors ahead of budget adoption. Later in the budget year, a revision of the programme and budget is adopted, this can be significantly higher than the initial budget after field offices have raised funds for new projects (...)

> Budgeting in the IOM today is more a way of accounting for fundraising efforts than a process of resource allocation.
>
> *Patz and Thorvaldsdottir, 2020: 80*

But while IOM might be exceptional in that fundraising clearly drives budgeting, the growing fusion between the two functions is also evident in other UN agencies. This has given rise to what we have identified as 'aspirational budgeting', which shows distinct evidence of what Knill and Steinebach (2022) call institutional, policy, and political entrepreneurialism. Thus, instead

> of procedures that allocate resources to programmatic priorities, UN system budgeting shifts towards aspirational processes that define resource needs and towards interlinked processes of resource mobilization and resource allocation (…) Aspirational budgeting under P-A complexity can combine the interests of major donors in limiting core budget growth with the interests of core recipient states to increase development spending overall, even if this can only be achieved by increasing voluntary contributions.
>
> *Patz and Goetz, 2019: 202*

Moreover, it helps to manage tensions within IPAs 'by giving agency to executive heads and central departments, but also to decentralized offices in such cases, such as finance coordinators or resource mobilizers of their organizations or departments' (Patz and Goetz, 2019: 202).

Turning to resourcing, our empirical work has centred on UNHCR, UNRWA, and IOM. Two observations stand out (for details see, in particular, Goetz and Patz, 2017; Patz and Thorvaldsdottir, 2020; Thorvaldsdottir and Patz, 2021; Thorvaldsdottir, Patz, and Goetz, 2022; Patz, Thorvaldsdottir, and Goetz, 2022). The first relates to the manner in which IOs and their IPAs communicate with stakeholders, notably, but by no means exclusively, member states and donors. Such communication is vital since it both reflects how the organisation understands its mission, but also seeks to engage stakeholders in the hope of securing both their long-term commitment and their short-term responsiveness to rapidly evolving policy challenges. To this end, we analysed the use of sentiments in the annual reports of UNRWA (1961–2019), UNHCR (1953–2019), and IOM (2000–2019). We have been especially interested in how the organisations modulate positive and negative sentiment over time. With a focus on the importance of resourcing, we have expected that IPAs that compete for resources 'need to signal performance, accountability and project success to stakeholders that can provide material or ideational resources, all of which are likely to lead to an increased use of positive sentiment' (Thorvaldsdottir and Patz, 2021: 798).

The empirical analysis has borne out this expectation. Thus, all 'three agencies have consistently moved towards higher positive sentiment baselines' (Thorvaldsdottir and Patz, 2021: 805). Differentiating between the three agencies, it is clear that

UNHCR has had a higher positive sentiment share than UNRWA over almost the entire history of both agencies, which could indicate greater resource mobilization needs by UNHCR. For UNRWA, shifts in donor community and expectations have meant that it has had to increase fundraising efforts since the mid-2000s, whereas in the case of IOM, joining the UN system in 2016 appears to be a major driver of IOM's increased use of positive sentiment.

Thorvaldsdottir and Patz, 2021: 805–806

Ensuring engagement and commitment on the part of stakeholders is vital for creating the resource bases of IOs, but the strings that come with funding may pose a threat to the capacity of IPAs to deliver on their organisations' mandates as donor interests and preferences and mandate-driven action need not be aligned. To examine whether such an effect really exists, we assembled a new dataset on UNHCR finances covering 1967 to 2016 to trace the allocation of UNCHR funding and developed an 'influence-weighted interest score' to capture the strength of donor interests (for details see Thorvaldsdottir, Patz, and Goetz, 2022). We complemented this analysis with a comparable exercise for IOM, covering 1999 to 2016 (for details see Patz and Thorvaldsdottir, 2020).

In the case of UNHCR, the analysis of its geographical allocation of resources in light of refugee populations demonstrates

an enduring ability (…) to allocate its country-level spending in line with its core mandate, responding to shifts in refugee populations across the world. This finding is robust throughout the history of the organization (…) our donor interest measurements suggest the lack of a clear link between bilateral donor interest and aid allocation by UNHCR. Only when faced with major refugee situations in Europe (i.e. in areas highly proximate to most major donors) do we observe a consistent attenuation in the organization's ability to allocate resources in line with displaced population needs.

Thorvaldsdottir, Patz and Goetz, 2022: 444–445

This finding does not imply that UNHCR is impervious to the concerns of donors. Rather, it is evidence of an IPA that has become very adroit at engaging in continuous communication with donors, so as to ensure that the organisations' priorities can be met while recognising donors' diverse priorities. Thus, our empirical research indicates that based

on their awareness of the agency's mandate and the distribution of populations of concern, top-level officials and resource mobilizers determine fund-raising targets and then engage with major donors to meet these targets. Over decades of engagement, UNHCR has developed a strong rapport with the

most important donor states and is able to strategically communicate with them to ensure a distribution of contributions that roughly meets its needs.

Thorvaldsdottir, Patz and Goetz, 2022: 459

By contrast, IOM resourcing is almost entirely project-based, 'with heavily decentralized fundraising, oriented primarily to serving donors through project implementation, both large and small, but heavily earmarked' (Patz and Thorvaldsdottir, 2020: 94). Moreover, 'IOM provides significant migration-related services *within* major donor states' (Patz and Thorvaldsdottir, 2020: 77). As a consequence, compared to UNHCR and its orientation towards refugees, 'the IOM expenditure patterns are much more directed towards other populations of concern and towards specific donor interests' (Patz and Thorvaldsdottir, 2020: 77).

In sum, the results of our empirical research on the allocation of funds and its determinants demonstrate important differences between the two organisations. Importantly, these differences are indicative of fundamental differences in the type of organisation, even though both belong to the UN system and both are active in the same policy domain. UNHCR has a mandate-driven IPA that possesses considerable skill in securing donors' commitment to its core tasks. By contrast, IOM is a decentralised service organisation that provides contractual services to its—mostly state—'customers'.

Why Do IPAs Manage?

The picture of budgeting and resourcing in IOs and the role of IPAs in mobilising and channelling resources that emerges from our qualitative and quantitative observations suggests that their ability to manage key organisational processes—which budgeting undoubtedly constitutes—and to support their core tasks with adequate resources is greater than might be expected. They do so in spite of challenges in terms of the tasks they face and the complexity of actor constellations. With a focus on global refugee policy, the tasks faced require the ability to sustain open-ended commitments and to respond instantaneously to highly volatile crisis situations. They also necessitate IPAs capable of formulating coherent policy responses while operating in a decentralised manner in often highly turbulent environments. For example, UNRWA operates across five territories and states, one of which, Syria, is war-torn. UNHCR acts globally in emergency situations, with often little or no local state capacities to draw on, as in the cases of Syria, Yemen, or South Sudan. IOM, in 2022, reports to be active in approximately 100 countries and maintains over 590 country office and suboffices. The decentralised nature of the tasks—regional, in the case of UNRWA or global, as in the cases of UNHCR and IOM—implies a decentralised administrative organisation, with regional and national offices often far removed from headquarters.

Administrative decentralisation is one aspect of the complex actor constellations that characterise many IOs as the relations between the centre and often far-flung field offices can easily become strained, and levels of operational autonomy

contested. Moreover, different sectors of the IO may compete for political attention and resources as, for example, in the case of UNRWA between those engaged in the provision of health versus educational services. Host countries may be influential stakeholders as may be the target populations and local staff of IOs, as, for example, in the case of UNRWA, with its highly unionised workforce. Complexity on the part of administrative 'agents' is often matched or even exceeded by complexity on the part of principals. The at time intense conflicts among member states of IOs are well-known. Moreover, in some cases, member states do not represent 'unitary' actors, since, for example, different national ministries may pursue distinct policies *vis-à-vis* the same IO. Moreover, non-state actors may be principals of paramount importance. For example, the European Union is among the largest donors in international refugee policy, channelling resources towards UNHCR, UNRWA, and IOM and, as was noted above, private donors may rival the funding power of public bodies.

How do the IPAs that have been at the centre of our empirical research manage to deal with these complexities in tasks and actor constellations? The answer to this question lies in organisational properties that allow them to navigate politically sensitive and volatile environments and changeable problem pressures. One of the early publications arising out of the work of the Research Unit on International Public Administrations already highlighted a number of distinct behavioural patterns and organisational properties and noted that 'the resilience of IPAs and their adaptability to forbidding context conditions challenges traditional accounts of bureaucracy' (Bauer et al., 2017: 192). The features credited with supporting such resilience and adaptability included, *inter alia*, high degrees of autonomy that keep principals in check; an entrepreneurial orientation that allows IPAs to respond flexibly to changing opportunity structures; an emphasis on expertise that provides IPAs with an important source of legitimacy and authority; and a distinct orientation towards shaping their organisational environment. The concluding chapter to the present volume (Knill and Steinebach, 2022) reinforces these points, emphasising policy, political and institutional entrepreneurialism, informational 'nodality' and expertise, and the importance of the interplay between formality and informality. Benz and Goetz (2022) build on these empirical insights when they question the bureaucratic nature of IPAs and, instead, suggest their conceptualisation as 'organisational tents', often less densely regulated through law than national bureaucracies; less reliant on permanent staff; or less reliant on a single source of income. Thus, they suggest that '[w]hat are frequently described as organizational drawbacks of international administration in fact allows them to adjust quickly and flexibly' (Benz and Goetz, 2022: 18).

The findings of our research on budgeting and resourcing provide strong empirical support for these characterisations. As regards budgeting, we have noted how budget routinisation, understood as the ability to develop and adopt the budget in line with formal requirements, has been achieved in most instances (Patz and Goetz, 2019: 199). As suggested above, it has been supported by both proceduralisation and budgetary segmentation. The former allows for informal practices to complement

formal rules while the latter allows flexibility through practices such as 'the nego-tiation of different parts of a single budget in parallel forums to the creation of fully separate budget procedures or (trust) funds outside the core budget' (Patz and Goetz, 2019: 200). Thus, IPAs have developed elaborate ways of accommo-dating the diversity of interests and preferences both among their differentiating principals, with an increasing reliance on non-state actors, and within their often highly decentralised IPAs; and they have learned to adjust to volatility in their tasks and their organisational environments.

Conclusion

What has the study of budgeting and resourcing contributed to our understanding of IPAs? What has been the value-added of paying systematic attention to time in studying IPAs? And is there anything to be learned from how the empirical research has been conducted?

Budgeting and resourcing are core organisational processes: as such they are both expressive of power and influence within organisations and organisational fields and they help to define those relationships. IPAs have developed elaborate formal and informal structures, processes, and routines for managing the complexities that arise from their tasks, the diverse interests and preferences of states and other donors, and their internally differentiated organisations. They have learned to exploit opportun-ities for the expansion of tasks and resources, and they have become very adroit at maintaining and sometimes even enhancing organisational autonomy while oper-ating in highly interconnected, multi-level administrative networks (Benz, 2022). Our analyses have underscored that IPAs are powerful actors in their own right, often capable of not just managing the diversity of interests of their member states and other donors but, in fact, skilful at turning the complexity of principals to their own advantage in pursuit of the maintenance and enhancement of their mandates and their autonomy of action. However, we have also seen the limits of IPAs' dex-terity when confronted with the 'power of the purse', notably when large donors drastically reduce or altogether stop their funding, although even in such cases, affected organisations, notably UNRWA, have been able to mobilise alternative sources of funding quickly so as to at least partly make up for the loss of funding.

Time has featured prominently in our analyses, whether it has concerned the formal schedules of budgeting; the empirically observable timelines of budgeting processes; the temporal qualities of policy problems with which IPAs have to deal; or the temporal features of their policy responses. This foregrounding of time-focused empirical observations has helped to identify some of the 'tent-like' qual-ities of IPAs, which have been noted in the previous section and are strongly tied an adaptable administration: flexibility in the timing of its actions; immediacy and the capacity to accelerate if necessary; organisational routines that balance regu-larity and predictability with the ability to quickly change course, if needed, and to expand and contract swiftly. It has also served to direct attention to the com-plex temporal layering of the tasks facing many IPAs, ranging, in an organisation

such as UNHCR, from providing rapid, first line-responses to emergency relief to the development of long-term advocacy policies. In short, a focus on temporality directs attention to factors of stability and volatility in the organisational environment of IPAs; to regularity and changeability in the institutions, organisations, actor constellations, processes, and policy problems; and to constancy and mutability in their contribution to global public policy.

To detect and grasp the distinct features of IPAs, whether they are understood as a specific variant of public bureaucracy or a non-bureaucratic type of public administration (Benz and Goetz, 2022), requires distinct research designs. They have to be able to capture organisational fluidity and porous boundaries rather than being oriented towards holding things 'constant' so as to allow for causal inference; and they have to allow for the interconnectedness of observations rather than treat them as discreet. Of course, such a sensitivity to configurative analysis does not imply the rejection of variable-oriented research. As our work on UNHCR resource allocation has shown, quantitative, variable-based research can make a critical contribution to understanding both how IPAs work and why they operate in a particular manner (Patz, Thorvaldsdottir, and Goetz, 2022). But a focus on complex configurations avoids the danger of misperceiving IPAs as the simple agents of stylised principals.

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